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Abstract
Future historians of the family will undoubtedly look upon the final decades of the twentieth century as a time
of upheaval, when a major shift occurred in the form and function of the Western family. During the last third
of the century, the nuclear family built around durable conjugal ties and a distinct division of labor based on
gender has given way to a multiplicity of kinship types. This new (or some would argue renewed) diversity of
family forms has provoked considerable commentary and controversy on the consequences of these changes
for producing basic civic values required for social order.
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consider some implications of the changes in family structure for the quality of family life, especially as viewed
from the vantage point of children. I shall explore, though surely not resolve, the question of whether the
deterioration of the nuclear family form is compromising the future stability of American society, as so many
observers believe to be the case. This issue cannot be addressed without considering the roiling public debate
over family values that has been generated by political and policy differences over how to address the
"problems" created by the decline of marriage, or at least the decline of marriage "as we have known it."
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Family Change and Family Diversity 
FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. 
INTRODUCTION 
FUTURE HISTORIANS of the family will undoubtedly look upon the final decades 
of the twentieth century as a time of upheaval, when a major shift occurred in 
the form and function of the Western family. During the last third of the cen- 
tury, the nuclear family built around durable conjugal ties and a distinct divi- 
sion of labor based on gender has given way to a multiplicity of kinship types. 
This new (or some would argue renewed) diversity of family forms has pro- 
voked considerable commentary and controversy on the consequences of these 
changes for producing basic civic values required for social order. 
In this paper I first examine the transformation that has taken place and the 
reasons why it came about. Then I consider some implications of the changes in 
family structure for the quality of family life, especially as viewed from the 
vantage point of children. I shall explore, though surely not resolve, the ques- 
tion of whether the deterioration of the nuclear family form is compromising 
the future stability of American society, as so many observers believe to be the 
case. This issue cannot be addressed without considering the roiling public 
debate over family values that has been generated by political and policy differ- 
ences over how to address the "problems" created by the decline of marriage, 
or at least the decline of marriage "as we have known it." 
WHAT HAS CHANGED 
By any historical standard, the changes that have occurred in the family over 
the past several decades have been truly remarkable. It can be fairly said that in 
no comparable era outside of wartime have we seen such a rapid shift in the 
shape of households and in the behavior of families. No doubt, these changes 
are highlighted by the fact that several decades ago one family type predomi- 
nated as never before: the vast majority of Americans were living or aspired to 
live in nuclear families, a form of the family that now ironically is referred to 
as the "traditional" American family. In some sense this attribution is not inap- 
propriate, because American families had always assumed a nuclear form; it 
nonetheless rings hollow to those able to recall that when this family form was 
in its heyday, many observers were bemoaning the disappearance of more ex- 
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tended and complex family forms and fearing that the nuclear family was be- 
coming isolated from the network of kin and the larger community. 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, before the revolution in gender roles occurred, 
complaints were commonly voiced about the headlong rush to early marriage, 
the segregation of women in the suburbs, the excessive dependency of children 
on their parents, the overindulgence of the young, and the number of marriages 
empty of emotion (Bell and Vogel 1968; Coser 1964; Winch 1963). These fea- 
tures of the nuclear family were said to contribute to the growing problem of 
delinquency, premarital sex, and school dropout among youth. When the revo- 
lution did occur, the emotionally charged character of the nuclear family was 
said to be a contributor to the discontents of youth in the late 1960s and 1970s 
(Flacks 1971; Slater 1970). These criticisms of the family seem almost quaint 
by contemporary standards, but they were experienced as very real by scholars 
and social critics at the time. Whether or not the complaints had merit, the 
hegemony of the nuclear family was viewed as a mixed blessing and was asso- 
ciated with many of the problems of growing up in American society (Friedan 
1983; Friedenberg 1964; Goodman 1960).' 
As we now know, the nuclear family in the 1950s was poised to become the 
"postmodern" family in the next several decades or, as Edward Shorter (1975) 
stated in his widely read book The Making of the Modern Family, to chart a 
course "straight for the heart of the sun." The term postmodern family has no 
precise meaning but generally designates a movement away from or delegitima- 
tion of patriarchal authority and a growing emphasis on personal autonomy of 
household members. Indeed, the term family itself is now culturally contested, a 
process that Peter and Brigitte Berger (1983/84) referred to as "the family 
wars." More than a few scholars have suggested that family as a singular is no 
longer appropriate; instead, by pluralizing the word to speak of American fami- 
lies, we encompass the new realities of American kinship. At least several well- 
known family sociologists have taken an even stronger position and advocate 
abandoning the word in scientific discourse altogether (Scanzoni et al. 1989). I 
do not think that semantic debates are likely to resolve the issues, though as I 
will point out later, the discussions of what constitutes family have important 
ramifications for family law and public policy. 
How we conceive of marriage, family, and kinship has been reshaped or 
perhaps even shattered by a configuration of economic and social changes that 
broke apart a tightly prescribed pattern of kinship (Farber 1973; Goode 1963; 
Parsons 1951; Schneider 1980). In a matter of thirty years, we have gone from 
a time when nearly everyone married, usually in late adolescence or early adult- 
hood, to a time when a growing minority will never wed, and most postpone 
marriage until their midtwenties or later. Marriage is no longer the master event 
that orchestrates the onset of sexual relations, parenthood, the departure from 
home or even the establishment of a household. These events have become 
more 'independent of one another-discrete moments in the life course (Medell 
1989; Modell, Furstenberg, and Hershberg 1976; Furstenberg 1982). 
Many family scholars have pointed out that we are not so much creating a 
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new life course as reclaiming a former one that prevailed until the twentieth 
century. It is certainly true t?at in the past, family careers were disorderly; 
events such_ as s~vere economic downturns that disrupted the supply of eligible 
p~rtners, migration patterns that produced unbalanced sex ratios, or disabling 
diseases a~d death that removed partners and parents created family instability. 
Sharp _reg10nal, class, and ethnic differences distinguished patterns of family 
formation (Coale and Watkins 1985; Hareven 1981). Until well into the twen- 
tieth ~entury, no standard form of "the American family" existed even though 
Amencans always preferred to live in independent family units and were com- 
mitted ~o strong conjugal bonds: however, the boundaries of family membership 
were highly permeable and often included related kin, servants, and boarders. 
Home life was often more chaotic than we frequently imagined it to have been. 
I? all b~t th~ small stratum of wealthy families, children were required to jus- 
tify their existence by economic production or were required to seek employ- 
ment elsewhere. It was not uncommon for parents to give their children up to 
orphana?es,_ foster care, or employment as a means of managing precarious 
economic circumstances (Bellingham 1988). 
In a recent book, John Gillis (1996) argues that the family as a sacred and 
~r~tected institution is a relatively recent cultural invention. Notions of privacy, 
mtimacy, and elaborate family rituals emerged only because religious and local 
community ~nstit~tio?s receded, yielding greater symbolic power to the family. 
A~d the nati?nahzat10n of these standards occurred only during the middle of 
this century in the postwar era, when family life became more accessible and 
affordable to all. 
The era of high domesticity was brief, and its demise swift. Between 1965 
~nd 1995, marriage became both less accessible and less affordable to a grow- 
mg number of Americans. Working-class Americans who frequently had been 
propelled into marriage by a pregnancy at midcentury began to consider options 
other than a shotgun wedding. Middle-class youth who confidently married and 
began families in or shortly after college extended their educational careers. 
Wo:11en stayed in school and entered the labor force, expecting to work for a 
p~nod before parenthood. Men became less confident that they could sustain a 
middle-class life on their earnings alone. 
_Rising rates of divorce shattered the ideal of life-long monogamy. The pre- 
rmum placed on marital satisfaction rose, creating higher standards for inti- 
macy, sexual gratification, and shared domestic duties. Individuals viewed mar- 
r!age as ever more daunting and hesitated to make permanent commitments so 
light~y. Temporary partnerships and cohabitation became alternatives to early 
marriage and, for a small minority, to matrimony itself (Bumpass 1990· Cherlin 
1992). ' 
Th~se patterns were not evenly distributed in American society. African 
Americans experienced a virtual collapse of early marriage beginning in the 
e_arly 1960s as a growing number of pregnant teenagers who would have mar- 
ned chose instead to become single parents. No doubt, some also resorted to 
abortion, but its legal availability was still a decade away. Despite the greater 
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. that family and economy must "fit" for effective production and reproduc- 
i~ea Goode argued that the nuclear family was ideally suited to the demands of 
ttonlndustrial economy, with the requirements of a flexible labor market de- 
:anding geographic mobility, gender specialization, and autonomous youth 
1 osely attached to the household. 0 In retrospect, an argument could have been made just as easily for the bad fit 
of the conjugal family with the industrial economy, espec~ally as it b~gan t? 
draw women into the labor force. The ideal of a clos~-kmt s!11all fa!111Iy umt 
anchored by a strong and enduring marriage became mcreasmgly difficult to 
achieve as the gender-based division of labor rapidly gave way to a dual-worker 
family system. Gender specialization within the family began to make less 
ense as women moved from being homemakers to paid workers in the econ- s ... 
omy. The model of marriage that prevailed at mi?cent_ury-tw~ Jommg_ to- 
gether as one-became less persuasive ~s a d~sign f~r ordenng relations 
between men and women. Moreover, the highly differentiated patterns of par- 
enting became less appropriate as well. The absent father-whether inside or 
outside the home-came to be seen as a problem not just for women who were 
bearing a disproportionate share of the household load but also for children 
who, it seems, missed the presence of males as caregivers and role models. 
Throughout the 1970s, the ideal of the nuclear family was attacked by many 
feminists, progressives, gays, and scholars of color who promoted the viability, 
if not the superiority, of alternative kinship arrangements. The rhetoric assault 
perhaps reached a peak in 1978 when the Carter administration was forced to 
cancel the White House Conference on the Family because it threatened to be 
politically embarrassing to the president if the deep ideological divisions over 
the family were permitted to surface. The public discussion actually contributed 
to the changes that were taking place concurrently (Lasch 1977; Tufte and 
Myerhoff 1979). No doubt it helped rationalize and perhaps legitimate the 
growth of varied family forms. Nonetheless, it seems likely that most of the 
change would have taken place had public discussion focused exclusively on 
the demise of the family and the costs to children, as it has in the 1990s. 
Indeed, the changes that have occurred from the 1980s to the present have 
taken place in a very conservative political climate. At least from the early 
Reagan years (and some might say starting with the Carter administration), 
calls for restoring family values were issued with increasing volume. However, 
the effect of these appeals appears to be quite limited, at least judging from 
demographic trends over the past two decades. 
Sexual behavior among the young continued to increase during the 1980s 
despite a "just say no" campaign for premarital chastity promoted by the Rea- 
gan administration. Trends in teenage childbearing seem similarly unaffected by 
a continuous stream of public information campaigns to discourage young men 
and women from having children early in life or prior to marriage (Hayes 1987; 
Luker 1996). Cohabitation has been steadily on the rise and has become vir- 
tually institutionalized as a stage of courtship or, for some, a de facto marriage 
(Bumpass 1990). 
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selectivity of those blacks who entered wedlock black marriages 1 ? b . ' a so bee less sta le (Cherlm 1992). By 1970, only 42% of black women i th ame 
ti . d n e popul 10n were marne compared with 60% of white women (Espenshade 1985 a- 
In part because these changes were so dramatic and because patter ). 
·1 ii . . ns of fam 
i Y ormation among whites were slower to change, social scientists b Ii - 
that changes in the black family were anomalous and distinctive (Rai e ievect 
Y . . nwater and ancey 1967). However, it seems mcreasingly evident that many f h 
h fi d . o t ese c anges were not con ne to Afncan Americans. Puerto Ricans hav . 
d l . . e experi- 
ence a most identical patterns, and recently it appears that a growing . 
f f I · hi · p1opor- 10n o ower-income w rte Amencans are retreating from marriage as 
(Farley 1995). Well 
WHY THE CHANGES OCCURRED 
It seem~ almost poin~less to determine whether these changes resulted from 
economic eve~ts, social transformations, or cultural shifts in the importance 
placed ~~ marriage. Large institutional changes rarely occur unless a confluence 
of co_nd1tions takes place. Individuals begin to reconsider their options when old 
solutions become unworkable. Tolerance for alternatives grows as more individ- 
uals engage in novel forms of behavior. Sanctions are weakened and new pat- 
terns become accepted even though they may be deemed less desirable ac- 
comodations to current realities (Gerson 1985). So it was with the rise of 
premarital sex, cohabitation, out-of-wedlock childbearing, and divorce. The 
model of the nuclear family became less attainable-not so much because peo- 
ple believed in it less, but because more and more people were unable to fulfill 
the demands required for behaving in the familiar way. 
. ''.V~lue stretch" is the term one sociologist used to describe how lower-class 
md!Vld~als begin to depart from mainstream practices (Rodman 1963). It is an 
appropn_at~_way of understanding how individuals come to behave in ways that 
at least initially they do not entirely believe in or even actively disapprove of. 
As values a~e st~etched, sanctions lose their grip, and more people talk openly 
a~out behavmg m ways that were previously thought unacceptable. So it was 
with a hos_t of family b~haviors in the 1960s and 1970s. To be sure, people had 
~or some time engaged m sexual relationships before marriage, lived together in 
mformal arrangements, and had children outside of wedlock, but such events 
were_ ~ot di~cussed in polite company-much less paraded in newspapers or 
telev1~10n without the distinct scent of scandal. Publicizing such actions was an 
occasion to deplore them, and so these not-so-uncommon behaviors were car- 
:ied out underground. The 1960s and 1970s broke down this state of "pluralistic 
ignorance." 
. Ironically, just before this transformation, a leading authority on family, Wil- 
ham J. Goode (1963), described the sweeping changes in family systems that 
were occurring worldwide and predicted that the "conjugal based" family of the 
West would become more widespread. Geode's prediction was based on the 
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Efforts to curb divorce and single parenthood have been equally unsuccess- 
f~l. As far back as the middle 1980s, scholars began to sound the alarm that 
high rates of marital dissolution were jeopardizing the welfare of children and 
the stability of society (Blankenhorn, Bayme, and Elshtain 1990; Popenoe 
1988; Wallerstein and Blakeslee 1989). Today, there are widespread calls for 
the tightening of divorce regulations. In fact, divorce rates have not risen since 
the late 1_970s. What has occurred is a widespread postponement of marriage in 
favor of mformal unions or solo living. These trends are largely responsible for 
the sharp growth of nonmarital childbearing (Morgan 1996). Fertility has risen 
among unmarried women, no doubt in part due to the declining attractiveness 
of marriage as a solution to prenuptial conception. Evidence suggests that the 
Murphy Browns-middle-class women who deliberately plan to become single 
parents-are still relatively rare (Alan Guttmacher Institute 1994). The ranks of 
never-married solo parents are largely filled by women who inadvertently be- 
co~e preg~ant, rej_ect the option of abortion, and see little gain to entering a 
umon that is perceived to be fragile from the start (Furstenberg 1995a). 
Marriage remains a privileged status. By this I mean that most Americans 
regard marriage as a preferred arrangement, especially when children are in- 
volved. However, couples frequently delay marriage as a hedge against the 
possibility that the union will not survive. Thus, marriage has increasingly 
become less the pledge of permanent commitment than a conditional commit- 
ment to remain together so long as both parties are willing and able. This 
cultural understanding has been reluctantly incorporated in the law and even 
in marriage rituals that speak less of permanent bonds and more of the impor- 
tance of equality, mutual respect, and intimacy-the cornerstones of a con- 
temporary relationship. 
The meaning of marriage has also changed with the shifting of gender roles 
occasioned by women's entrance into the labor force-especially married 
women with children. In the course of several decades, labor force participation 
of married women with preschool children went from being a rarity (18.6% in 
1960) to being the prevailing pattern (61.7% in 1994). Little wonder that ob- 
servers began to notice the disappearance of the Ozzie and Harriet form of the 
family (Blankenhorn, Bayme, and Elshtain 1990). In fact, no prevailing form of 
the family exists today that represents the typical family such as existed in the 
middle of this century when radio listeners and then television viewers were 
introduced to Ozzie and Harriet, Leave It to Beaver, and Father Knows Best. 
As I stated earlier, the tightly orchestrated movement into marriage and 
childbearing with its highly segregated roles for men and women has all but 
~ollapsed. Individuals now typically live in many different families during the 
life course (Buchman 1989). A couple may cohabit, marry with both partners 
working, raise children while the wife works part-time, separate and co-parent 
bef~re. one or both remarry-themselves forming new families and perhaps 
begmnmg a cycle of further differentiation. Previously, it was relatively easy to 
distinguish between people who were doing it the right way (even if they 
cheated a little by having sex and perhaps getting pregnant prior to marriage) 
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and those who were not-those living in sin, unmarried mothers, or divorcees. 
Now with family forms so diverse, it is nearly impossible to draw such sharp 
distinctions between the right and wrong ways of organizing families. In this 
sense as Judith Stacey (1993) argues, "the" family as a hegemonic cultural 
construct has been delegitimized. 
A good deal of public opinion data support Stacey's argument. Although 
individuals continue to think that living in formal and durable marriages is 
ideal, most Americans tolerate, if not endorse, alternative family forms (Chad- 
wick and Heaton 1992). To be sure, Americans continue to disagree-often 
heatedly-over these questions, as evidenced by the cultural wars openly 
waged at the 1992 Republican Convention and by the controversy over gay 
marriage that has surfaced since Hawaii began to consider changing its mar- 
riage statutes to permit members of the same sex to form legal unions. None- 
theless, the very discussion of these values would not and probably could not 
have occurred several decades ago. Divided opinion on what constitutes legiti- 
mate forms of the family itself represents a remarkable social fact. 
Whether this division of opinion necessarily implies that "family prac- 
tices" -how we live in families-have been weakened, particularly in ways 
that compromise the interests of children, remains an open question. I realize 
that for many observers and even for many social scientists, this matter seems 
settled: most believe the family has become less important and less effective 
during the final third of this century (Popenoe 1988; Uhlenberg and Eggebeen 
1986). However, part of the evidence cited for the decline of the family typ- 
ically refers to the demographic data on the deinstitutionalization of marriage 
and increases in nonmarital fertility. In a certain sense, that evidence begs the 
question because it neatly sidesteps the issue of whether variation in the kinship 
forms represents a weakening of the family (Condran and Furstenberg 1994). 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAMILY CHANGE 
Have Americans become less committed to the importance of family? This is 
not an easy question to answer with the available data. The family continues to 
remain the institution most highly valued by Americans (National Commission 
on Children 1991). To be sure, Americans worry about family disintegration, 
but they remain committed to families and convinced that their own families 
are in good shape. I can find no evidence to suggest that parents are sacrificing 
less for their children. Indeed, a strong case can be made that parents feel more 
compelled than ever before to invest in their children's welfare-in both their 
material and psychological well-being (Furstenberg 1995b). 
Admittedly, the data are sparse, but I suspect that were we able to monitor 
private household expenditures, investment per child is probably rising. The 
flow of resources that once went from children to parents has virtually stopped 
except perhaps in the parents' extreme old age. Many parents continue to sup- 
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port their children well into early adulthood by providing allowances and hous- 
ing supplements (Lye 1996). 
A great deal of data suggests that children continue to rely on their parents' 
advice and respect their opinions as they move through adolescence and into 
early adulthood (Modell 1989; National Commission on Children 1991). True 
fathers who have lived apart from their children typically play an ancillary and 
often mar~inal r~l~ in these continuing patterns of support. This has certainly 
harmed children s interests. Step- and surrogate fathers have taken up some of 
the slack, but most research suggests that while stepparents may improve chil- 
dren's material position, on average children do not benefit by their presence in 
the home (Cherlin and Furstenberg 1994; White 1993). 
It is also not easy to assemble evidence on time investment by parents. 
Clearly, the entrance of women into the labor force has meant less time avail- 
able to spend with children in the home (Larson and Richards 1994; Rossi and 
Rossi 1990). Yet, comparisons over time frequently ignore the number of chil- 
dren in the household and competing obligations of parents in earlier times. At 
least some time studies suggest that monitoring and care of children has not 
decreased over the past half century even if mothers spend less time in the 
household (Robinson 1990). Again, the data are more ambiguous for fathers. 
When present in the home, it appears that they spend more time providing 
direct child care, but a higher proportion live apart from their children. 
Grandparents remain a strong presence in children's lives. Fewer children 
grow up residing with grandparents in the home, but a greater number have 
contact with more of their grandparents. Because of increasing longevity of 
grandparents and modem means of transportation and communication, the older 
generation can often enjoy closer contact with their children and grandchildren 
than was possible earlier in this century. Moreover, declining rates of fertility 
imply that fewer children will receive the attentions of a greater number of 
grandparents. Indeed, most children report extensive contact with at least some 
of their grandparents. The attenuation of paternal links with children means that 
children are more likely to maintain contact with their mothers' kin, giving a 
slight matrilineal tilt to our kinship system (Johnson 1988). Yet, it also appears 
that to some extent stepgrandparents may pick up the slack (Cherlin and Fur- 
stenberg 1986). 
I conclude two broad lessons from the admittedly incomplete evidence on 
kinship patterns. First, children may be less exposed to the continuous and 
stable influence of two parents. Nonetheless, kinship bonds remain strong and 
omnipresent for most children. Second, greater variability exists in the kinship 
system than was present at midcentury. The absence of standardized patterns 
may be destabilizing the family, but it may also signify a realignment of kinship 
away from the conjugal patterns toward greater reliance on lineage, especially 
matrilineage. 
It is essential to keep in mind the centrality of the "isolated" nuclear family is 
a relatively recent development in Western history (Parsons 1951). Some schol- 
ars argue that we may be returning to the status quo ante when children were 
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Jess exclusively supervised by parents and were more the shared responsibility 
of extended kin and members of the community. If this shift is indeed occur- 
ring, it is not surprising that Americans, especially, would find this change 
disturbing. By international standards, this nation has always been committed to 
a highly privatized nuclear family system (Bellah et al. 1985). American fami- 
lies, it has been said, were born modem: that is, from colonial times, our culture 
has promoted a conjugal family form. 
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, foreign travelers took note of 
the strength of the domestic unit, the relative intimacy of marital relationships, 
the absence of hierarchy, and the democratic quality of parent-child relation- 
ships in American families (Furstenberg 1966; Hiner and Hawes 1985). The 
shrewdest of these observers, Alexis de Tocqueville (1835), noted that Ameri- 
can families, buttressed by local institutions-religious and voluntary commu- 
nity organizations-helped protect individuals from possible intrusions of the 
state. An ample supply of farmland and a distant frontier also contributed to the 
flourishing of independent households and strong conjugal ties. Far earlier than 
citizens of other nations, Americans embraced the importance of "romantic 
love" as a basis for marriage and egalitarian family relationships (Rothman 
1984). And compared with people of other Western nations, Americans married 
exceptionally young and were more geographically mobile. Community and 
extended kinship ties remained strong throughout the nineteenth century but 
were probably less accentuated than in Europe. Both economic conditions and a 
strong political distrust of state powers helped foster the ideal of the conjugal 
family and probably hindered the growth of the welfare state. 
Moreover, this view of the family as a protector against state interference, a 
"haven in the heartless world," (Lasch 1977) is an idea that grew in response to 
the harsh demands of early industrialization and continues even today as eco- 
nomic institutions exert control over family life (Coser 1964). The relegation of 
women and then children into the domestic sphere helped foster the notion that 
working men could find refuge and relief from excessive work demands at 
home. This belief created a common understanding in American culture that a 
household consisting of a working father and a nonworking mother is the most 
"natural" way of raising children, a concept that would elude many cultures in 
the world (Murdock 1949; Schneider 1980). In the 1950s and early 1960s, a 
good deal of the sociology of the family was devoted to explaining how this 
form of the family arose from functional requirements of societies, especially 
advanced industrialized societies (Bell and Vogel 1968). For a relatively short 
span of time- from the end of the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth 
century-it thus became "natural" for women to specialize in domestic and 
child care and for men to work outside the home. The single-wage-earner fam- 
ily went out of style fairly quickly but not without a certain amount of cultural 
resistance. Married women, who had first entered the labor force during the 
Depression from necessity and during World War II out of patriotism, were 
pressured to return to the home to make room for the returning vets. The huge 
government subsidies provided for education, housing, and employment helped 
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sustain the single-wage-earner family throughout the 1950s and promoted an 
era of domestic mass production. However, the pressures of supporting the 
children of the baby boom enticed married women back into the labor force in 
steadily increasing numbers. At the same time, rising levels of divorce pushed 
mothers with young children to seek employment even when they preferred to 
remain at home. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the number of working 
mothers steadily increased, and the age at which women returned to the labor 
force declined. By 1980 a majority of married women with dependent children 
were gainfully employed outside the home, and by 1990 a majority of those 
with children under age six held jobs outside the home (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census 1996: 399). 
Public opinion clearly favored keeping mothers in the home, and only as 
change occurred in the gender composition of the work force did views begin to 
shift and even then only reluctantly (Virginia Slims 1995). Again, it seems 
likely that the behavior of families stretched social norms in ways that legiti- 
mated the practices post facto. In the 1960s social scientists were divided on the 
effects of working mothers on children's development, but fairly soon a con- 
sensus emerged that the general impact was negligible. Many Americans con- 
tinue to believe that children are better off if mothers remain in the home 
(National Commission on Children 1991; Virginia Slims 1995). Nonetheless, as 
the 1996 Welfare Reform Act attests, public support for mothers working in 
their households-at least if they are poor-has largely evaporated (Skocpol 
and Wilson 1994). 
A spate of research linking employment patterns of mothers to the develop- 
ment and well-being of children searched in vain for evidence demonstrating 
the superiority of families with full-time housewives (Belsky and Eggebeen 
1991; Menaghan and Parcel 1990; National Research Council 1993). The re- 
sults of these studies have been quite consistent in showing no overall differ- 
ences based on the working status of mothers. Employment, it seems, affects 
child rearing patterns differently depending on how parents regard their jobs 
and the desirability of working as well as what kinds of support exists for 
working parents and their children. By now most investigators have stopped 
looking for a general effect of employment and have begun to ask more sophis- 
ticated questions about how work is managed by families involving both the 
link between workplace and home, the availability and quality of child care, 
and the internal routines that arise inside the family in response to work de- 
mands. It is widely assumed that influences of work on children operate indi- 
rectly through these sorts of mechanisms but that it is difficult to identify any 
"direct" effects of work on children's welfare because so much variation exists 
in work patterns and their consequences for family life. 
Interestingly, researchers often resist adopting a similar logic when it comes 
to assessing the impact of other features of family change discussed earlier in 
this paper. For example, many investigations of the effects of divorce and non- 
marital childbearing continue to focus on the dichotomy between nuclear and 
nonnuclear families rather than trying to understand when and under what cir- 
cumstances the family's form affects children. The broad comparisons between 
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two-biological-parent households and other arrangements has diverted attention 
away from how parents successfully manage the demands of childbearing and 
childrearing whatever their marital status. It is as if parents who live together 
are more or less assured success, and those who do not are guaranteed to fail 
despite the considerable evidence to the contrary (Furstenberg and Cherlin 
1991; McLanahan and Sandefur 1994). 
Most studies show that children are more likely to thrive when they receive 
continuous care from parents, when parents invest in the relationship by provid- 
ing time and material resources, when parents provide appropriate control of 
the child's impulses and actions according to his or her age, and when parents 
display warmth, concern, and confidence in the child's ability. All these quali- 
ties, no doubt, benefit from the presence of two parents. Whether these parents 
need be biological parents is still unsettled. We do not know whether adopted 
parents, gay parents, or a single parent and grandmother or a single parent by 
him or herself does as well as two biological parents when such arrangements 
come with stability, material resources, and skillful practices. 
The presence of more than one parent generally confers added benefits to 
children for reasons other than the obvious ones of providing more time and 
resources. When they share common values and concerns, parents can reinforce 
each other's practices and monitor their results. In effect, the family as a cohe- 
sive social system generates social capital by creating a common culture and 
routines. Family-based social capital will arise when parents successfully col- 
laborate and when they are embedded in a larger network of kin (Bott 1971). 
Relatively little research has addressed how social capital within the family is 
built and sustained or, for that matter, how it may be dissipated by conflict 
within the household or across the generations. It seems also likely that divorce 
and remarriage are events that can destroy existing social capital if it has not 
already been dissipated by marital conflict. 
Parents-whether residing together or apart-can ally with other institutions 
outside the family as ways of garnering social capital that may enforce their 
standards. Beyond the circle of kinship, they are most likely to rely on religious 
institutions to embed their children in a community of like-minded individuals. 
A long tradition of research has shown that religiosity is associated both with 
family stability and successful outcomes for children (Blood and Wolfe 1960; 
Thornton, Axinn, and Hill 1992). Of course, more than one reason may explain 
this result, including self-selection. However, it seems likely that immersion in 
religious institutions builds social capital, as Coleman (1988) and others have 
argued. 
Arguing as I do that children will generally do better when they have two (or 
perhaps more) parents does not lead me to conclude that such arrangements are 
invariably preferable or that most children cannot thrive in single-parent fami- 
lies. The evidence suggests otherwise. Family structure explains a relatively 
small amount of the variation in key outcomes of success such as educational 
attainment, mental health, or problem behavior, especially when single-parent- 
hood does not expose children to poverty, conflict, and instability. Yet, we can- 
not gainsay the fact that in American society, where economic and social sup- 
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port for families of all types is meager, children are more likely to be disadvan, 
taged when they grow up in a single-parent household. The reverse is just 
true: children are more likely to grow up in a single-parent household wh:s 
they are disadvantaged. Mounting evidence suggests that disadvantage breed~ 
f~mily ins~ability by undermining confidence in marriage, necessitating impro- 
vised and impermanent arrangements, and restricting access to good neighbor- 
hoods, schools, and social services. 
This circular causality has been at the center of policy debates about welfare 
family struct_ure.' and. the well-being of_ children, with conservatives claimin~ 
that economic mcentives have made smgle parenthood more attractive than 
work, and liberals insisting that the absence of work is to blame for the erosion 
of marriage and family life. Chicken or egg?-both arguments oversimplify the 
transformation in the family; neither prescription-eliminating welfare or creat- 
ing jobs-is likely to reverse the trends of the twentieth century, which have 
their roots in multiple and interrelated cultural, political, demographic, and eco- 
nomic forces. The ideological conflicts that dominate public discussion about 
family values are curiously reminiscent of other moments of social dislocation 
in American history. We are no more likely to restore the conjugal family 
rooted in the ideal of premarital sexual chastity, early and lifelong monogamy, 
and a sharply drawn division of labor between men and women than we arc to 
bring back the family farm. 
Yet, the presumption that families can and should be self-sufficient remains a 
powerful image in American society-so much so that even the African 
proverb that "it takes a village to raise a child" has become a source of contro- 
versy when employed by Hillary Rodham Clinton (1996) to generate public 
support for children. Although safeguarding the ecological system is a well- 
accepted policy premise when it comes to the natural environment, the idea of 
extending this notion to children and families continues to be politically conten- 
tious, suggesting as it does that the family is not completely self-sufficient and 
that parents are not entirely autonomous. 
As mentioned earlier, Americans, when compared with citizens of other na- 
tions with advanced economies, are committed to a highly privatized notion of 
the family. We are inclined to regard efforts to build supportive institutions that 
share child-care responsibilities with parents as state intrusions upon the natural 
rights of parents. Over the past several years, "parents' rights" legislation has 
been introduced in many states as a corrective to what its proponents believe 
are efforts to undermine the authority of parents. Although most Americans do 
not subscribe to such an extreme idea of parental autonomy, we distrust state 
institutions and favor voluntary, local systems of support. Tocqueville under- 
stood America political culture well when he identified the central importance 
of mediating institutions that reduce the power of the government over indi- 
viduals, and foremost among these mediating institutions was the democratic 
family. 
When Tocqueville visited America, we were still an agrarian nation and re- 
mained so throughout the nineteenth century. The agrarian ideal of a largely 
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self-sufficient family supported by local civic institutions has survived this cen- 
tury, though its credibility is being stretched to the breaking point as we head 
into the next century. We continue to rely on the family as the major, if not 
exclusive, mechanism for allocating resources to children, knowing full well 
that it generates extreme inequalities in income and opportunities, not to men- 
tion cultural and social capital. Correcting these inequalities remains a major 
challenge if American society is to adhere to its tenets of equality of oppor- 
tunity and meritocracy. 
Parents increasingly share the responsibility for preparing their children for 
economic and civic roles with other institutions, but parents are granted author- 
ity for "subcontracting" training to those institutions: schools, churches, volun- 
tary organizations, and the like. Management or oversight of the child's in- 
volvement in these institutions has become a major activity of parents, probably 
of no less importance to the child's success in later life than in-home child- 
rearing practices. Yet, many parents differ enormously in their knowledge and 
access to institutions outside the home that affect the child's life chances. Dif- 
ferences by class, race, and ethnicity compound and magnify parents' individ- 
ual differences in ability to manage the external world. No doubt, too, these 
status differences could be linked as well to parents' belief in their capacities to 
invest in institutions outside the home. And whatever their sense of "personal 
efficacy," a large number of parents simply do not have the means to live in the 
right neighborhoods, send their children to the right schools, or pay for quality 
child care, afterschool activities, and summer camp. 
Our commitment to helping parents remains largely rhetorical in the form of 
exhorting parents to spend more time with their children and take better care of 
them. This rhetoric is not without its effect. The vast majority of citizens be- 
lieve that American parents spend too little time with their children, are lax in 
their discipline, and are less willing to make sacrifices in their behalf. However 
when queried about the state of their own families, parents are much more 
upbeat in their evaluations. While feeling pinched for time, most parents are 
very positive about the quality of their family life. Moreover, children generally 
concur with their parents' assessments though, not surprisingly, adolescents are 
slightly more critical of parental practices. Still, it is obvious that most families 
think that it is the other folks who are not living up to their end of the bargain 
(Furstenberg 1995b). 
This belief is likely to be especially pronounced when the other folks are the 
poor and minorities. Despite evidence to the contrary, most Americans believe 
that the poor hold different aspirations for their children and are less capable 
and competent parents. Ethnic minorities regardless of class, perhaps blacks 
especially, are likely to engender similar suspicions from the public at large, 
and these suspicions have been unscrupulously exploited by elected officials. 
Diversity has increasingly become a codeword to many Euro-Americans for 
a challenge to the American way of life, including the so-called traditional 
family. 
Americans, and perhaps social scientists as well, may overestimate the signif- 
160 HOW MUCH HAS REALLY CHANGED? 
icance of family change in accounting for changes in the well-being of children. 
Although rising levels of family instability surely contribute to the ill-being of 
children, they are not the exclusive and probably not the primary explanation 
for changes in the welfare of children. I come to this judgment for several 
reasons: First, the vast research literature on the immediate and long-term ef- 
fects of marital disruption on children provides a consistent view that divorce 
has moderate to large effects in many realms of behavior. However, some por- 
tion of that effect is due to the family environment before disruption occurs and 
to the types of individuals who are predisposed to divorce or to single-parent- 
hood. After taking account of these differences, the impact of the single-parent- 
hood itself is reduced. 
Second, macrolevel trends in children's ill-being as measured by such indica- 
tors as school dropout, drug use, delinquency, and teenage childbearing do not 
track well with trends in family change as measured by either the level of 
single-parenthood or women in the labor force. The latter have risen more or 
less continuously, whereas the former have fluctuated from decade to decade. 
Children's welfare appears to reflect what demographers refer to as period ef- 
fects, that is, immediate temporal influences resulting more from economic, 
political, and cultural conditions or exposure to media than from cohort effects 
that birth groups can-y with them over a lifetime. This observation is supported 
by international data as well: there seems to be little con-elation between levels 
of problem behavior and the amount of family change. Northern European na- 
tions have witnessed astoundingly high levels of family change in the past 
several decades with no large apparent impact on levels of problem behavior 
among youth. At least at a superficial level changes in the family and the condi- 
tions of youth seem to be weakly con-elated if they are correlated at all. 
Interestingly, too, the rhetoric of a decline in family values is much more 
pronounced in Anglo than in northern European countries. This may reflect the 
greater or more exclusive role that the family is expected to play in determining 
the child's fate in these nations. Of course, in the Scandinavian countries, the 
welfare state also plays a more prominent role in mitigating the impact of fam- 
ily change by allocating resources to children according to their needs, rather 
than relying on the family as the main source of material well-being or institu- 
tional access. Thus, it seems that appeals to strengthening family values are 
likely to be sounded in nations that regard the family as a protective institution 
against the potential intrusion of the state. 
I, 
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
I have discussed several interconnected themes that have implications for the 
future of the family. First, I argued that the direction of change in the family 
that has produced a weaker conjugal system and destabilized the ideal of the 
nuclear family has not resulted, strictly speaking, from a shift in cultural prefer- 
ences but a host of concurrent trends undermining the viability of this kinship 
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arrangement. These trends have occurred in nearly all highly developed econ- 
omies. In virtually all Western nations, women have been brought into the job 
economy, marriage occurs later, fertility has declined, and divorce and single- 
parenthood have increased. These patterns are not likely to disappear in the 
near future or to be altered by rhetoric appeals to traditional values. 
Class and ethnic differences, in the short run at least, are likely to grow 
rather than diminish, exacerbating the differences between the preferred family 
patterns of the affluent and the adaptive kinship arrangements of the dispos- 
sessed. It is entirely possible that in another quarter of a century we may look 
back on the family of today nostalgically. Family systems are likely, even for 
the well-off, to become more complex and less predictable, as they have over 
the past several decades. This means that many more children are likely to 
grow up with more rather than less family instability. Even stable two-parent 
families will continue to feel the pinch of balancing work and domestic 
responsibilities. 
This condition puts a demand on the state to pick up some of the slack by 
providing child care, medical insurance, preschool programs, afterschool ser- 
vices, summer activities, and so on to ease the burdens placed on parents who 
do not have the means to arrange for these services privately. As we have seen 
in the past two decades, Americans have become ever more resistant to using 
public funds to support the family, presumably because we are reluctant to 
intrude on "parents' rights." Our commitment to the privatized family, sheltered 
from state interference, arouses fears of government intrusion in this country 
more than in most other industrialized nations. "Socializing" children, in theory, 
is up to parents, not to state-supported, let alone state-run, institutions and ser- 
vices. But this ideology protects the privileged and conceals the obvious fact 
that parents cannot shoulder so much of the burden of investing human capital 
in children. The arrangement that worked well enough in an agrarian economy 
and in the early stages of industrialization is simply insufficient to equip chil- 
dren for the twenty-first-century economy. To take an obvious example, we 
cannot rely on the family to expose children to computer literacy, a skill that is 
becoming increasingly important to children in the educational system. 
Our cherished notions of the family may be getting in the way of providing 
adequately for children who do not have the benefit of family resources. No 
doubt we would be better off if all children were able to grow up in stable and 
harmonious two-parent families. However, this prospect is unrealistic. In any 
event, this expectation still places an increasingly high burden on low- and 
middle-income parents who cannot provide adequately for the growing require- 
ment of college and beyond. Privately, many families have accommodated by 
greater personal sacrifice. As one low-income parent told me: "It really requires 
four jobs to achieve a decent standard of living." However, this same woman 
admitted that she and her partner rarely saw each other and had contemplated 
splitting up. The paradox is that we seem to be undermining families that we 
purport to protect by our peculiarly American-style relationship between the 
family and state. We need to think intelligently about a way of resolving this 
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public/private d!le1;1ma .lest w~ undermine the family in the interests of saving it 
and put our nation s children m even greater jeopardy in the future. 
Norn 
1. For excellent commentaries see the recent histories of the 1950s by May ( 1988) 
Modell (1989), Skolnick ( 1991 ), Coontz ( 1992), etc. ' 
REFERENCES 
Alan Guttmacher Institute. 1994. Sex and America's Teenagers. New York: Alan Gutt- 
macher Institute. 
Bell, Norman W., and Ezra F. Vogel, eds. 1968. A Modern Introduction to The Familv. 
New York: Free Press. , 
Bellah, Robert N., R. Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton. 
1985. Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Bellingham, Bruce. 1988. "The History of Childhood since the Invention of Childhood: 
Some Issues in the Eighties." Journal of Family History 13: 347-58. 
Belsky, Jay, and David Eggebeen. 1991. "Maternal Employment and Young Children's 
Socioemotional Development." Journal of Marriage and the Family 53: 1083-98. 
Berger, Brigitte, and Peter L. Berger. 1983/1984. The War over the Family. Garden City, 
N.Y.: Anchor Books. 
Blankenhorn, David, Steven Bayme, and Jean Bethke Elshtain, eds. 1990. Rebuilding the 
Nest: A New Commitment to the American Family. Milwaukee, Wis.: Family Service 
America. 
Blood, Robert, 0., and Donald M. Wolfe. 1960. Husbands and Wives. New York: The 
Free Press. 
Bott, Elizabeth. 1971. Family and Social Network, 2d ed. New York: Free Press. 
Buchmann, Marlis 1989. The Script of Life in Modern Society. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Bumpass, Larry L. 1990. "What's Happening to the Family? Interactions between Demo- 
graphic and Institutional Change." Demography 27: 483-90. 
Chadwick, Bruce A., and Tim B. Heaton, eds. 1992. Statistical Handbook on the Ameri- 
can Family. Phoenix, Ariz.: Oryx. 
Che~lin, Andrew J. 1992. Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage, rev. and enlarged ed. Cam- 
bndge: Harvard University Press. 
Cherlin, Andrew J., and Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. 1986. The New American Grandparent: 
A Place in the Family, a Life Apart. New York: Basic Books. 
---. 1994. "Stepfamilies in the United States: A Reconsideration." Annual Review 
of Sociology 20: 359-81. 
Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 1996. It Takes a Village: and Other Lessons Children Teach 
Us. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Coale, Ansley J., and Susan Cotts Watkins, eds. 1985. The Decline of Fertility in Eu- 
rop~: The ~evised Proceedings of a Conference on the Princeton European Fertility 
Project. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
FAMILY CHANGE AND FAMILY DIVERSITY 163 
Coleman, James S. 1988. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." American 
Journal of Sociology 94 (Suppl. 95): S95-S 120. 
Condran, Gretchen A., and Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. 1994. "Are Trends in the Well- 
Being of Children Related to Changes in the American Family? Making a Simple 
Question More Complex." Population, 6 (Nov-Dec): 1613-38. 
Coontz, Stephanie. 1992. The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia 
Trap. New York: Basic Books. 
Coser, Rose L., ed. 1964. The Family: Its Structure and Functions. New York: St. Mar- 
tin's Press. 
Espenshade, Thomas J. 1985. "The Recent Decline of American Marriage: Blacks and 
Whites in Comparative Perspective." Pp. 53-90 in Contemporary Marriage, edited by 
Kingsley Davis. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Farber, Bernard. 1973. Family and Kinship in Modern Society. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, 
Foresman. 
Farley, Reynolds, ed. 1995. State of the Union: America in the 1990s. Vols. 1 and 2. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Flacks, Richard. 1971. Youth and Social Change. Chicago: Markham. 
Friedan, Betty. 1983. The Feminine Mystique. New York: Norton. 
Friedenberg, Edgar Z. 1964. The Vanishing Adolescent. Boston: Beacon Books. 
Furstenberg, Frank F., Jr. 1966. "Industrialization and the American Family: A Look 
Backward." American Sociological Review 31 (3): 326-37. 
---. 1982. "Conjugal Succession: Reentering Marriage after Divorce." Pp. 107-146 
in Life Span Development and Behavior. Vol. 4, edited by Paul B. Baltes and Orville 
Gilbert Brim. New York: Academic Press. 
---. 1995a. "Fathering in the Inner-City: Paternal Participation and Public Policy." 
Pp. 119-47 in Fatherhood: Contemporary Theory, Research and Social Policy, edited 
by William Marsiglia. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. 
---. 1995b. "Family Change and the Welfare of Children: What Do We Know and 
What Can We Do about It?" Pp. 245-57 in Gender and Family Change in Indus- 
trialized Countries, edited by Karen 0. Mason and An-Magritt Jensen. Oxford: 
Clarendon. 
Furstenberg, Frank F., Jr., and Andrew J. Cherlin. 1991. Divided Families: What Hap- 
pens to Children When Parents Part. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Gerson, Kathleen. 1985. Hard Choices. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Gillis, John R. 1996. A World of Their Own Making: Myth, Ritual, and the Quest for 
Family Values. New York: Basic Books. 
Goode, William J. 1963. World Revolution and Family Patterns. New York: Free Press. 
Goodman, Paul. 1960. Growing Up Absurd: Problems of Youth in the Organized System. 
New York: Random House. 
Hareven, Tamara K. 1981. Family Time and Industrial Time: The Relationship between 
the Family and Work in a New England Industrial Community. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hayes, Cheryl D., ed. 1987. Risking the Future: Adolescent Sexuality, Pregnancy, and 
Childbearing. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
Hiner, N. Ray, and Joseph M. Hawes, eds. 1985. Growing Up in America: Children in 
Historical Perspective. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 
Johnson, Colleen L. 1988. Ex Familia: Grandparents, Parents, and Children Adjust to 
Divorce. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 
Larson, Reed, and Maryse H. Richards. 1994. Divergent Realities: The Emotional Lives 
of Mothers, Fathers, and Adolescents. New York: Basic Books. 
164 HOW MUCH HAS REALLY CHANGED? FAMILY CHANGE AND FAMILY DIVERSITY 165 
Lasch, Christopher. 1977. Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged. New York: 
Basic Books. 
Luker, Kristen. 1996. Dubious Conceptions. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Lye, Diane. 1996. "Adult Child-Parent Relationships." Annual Review of Sociology 22: 
79-102. 
May, Elaine T. 1988. Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era. New 
York: Basic Books. 
McLanahan, Sarah, and Gary Sandefur. 1994. Growing Up with a Single Parent. Cam- 
bridge: Harvard University Press. 
Menaghan, Elizabeth G., and Toby L. Parcel. 1990. "Paternal Employment and Family 
Life," Journal of Marriage and the Family 52: 1079-98. 
Model!, John. 1989. Into One's Own: From Youth to Adulthood in the United States, 
1920-1975. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Model!, John, Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., and Theodore Hershberg. 1976. "Social Change and 
Transitions to Adulthood in Historical Perspective." Journal of Family History 1: 7-32. 
Morgan, S. Philip. 1996. "Characteristic Features of American Fertility: A Description of 
Late Twentieth Century U. S. Fertility Trends and Differentials." Population and De- 
velopment Review 22 (Suppl): 19-63. 
Murdock, George P. 1949. Social Structure. New York: Macmillan. 
National Commission on Children. 1991. Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda for 
Children and Families. Washington, D.C.: National Commission on Children. 
National Research Council. 1993. Losing Generations: Adolescents in High-Risk Set- 
tings. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
Parsons, Talcott. 1951. The Social System. New York: Free Press. 
Popenoe, David. 1988. Disturbing the Nest: Family Change and Decline in Modern 
Societies. New York: Aldine De Gruyter. 
Rainwater, Lee, and William L. Yancey. 1967. The Moynihan Report and the Politics of 
Controversy. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Robinson, John. 1990. "The Time Squeeze." American Demographics 12: 30-33. 
Rodman, H. 1963. "The Lower-Class Value Stretch." Social Forces 42 (3): 205-15. 
Rossi, Alice S., and Peter H. Rossi. 1990. Of Human Bonding: Parent-Child Relations 
across the Life Course. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Rothman, Ellen K. 1984. Hands and Hearts: A History of Courtship in America. New 
York: Basic Books. 
Scanzoni, John, Karen Polonko, Jay Teachman, and Linda Thompson. 1989. The Sexual 
Bond: Rethinking Families and Close Relationships. Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Pub- 
lications. 
Schneider, David M. 1980. American Kinship: A Cultural Account, 2d ed. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Shorter, Edward. 1975. The Making of the Modern Family. New York: Basic Books. 
Skocpol, Theda, and William J. Wilson. 1994. "Welfare As We Need It." New York 
Times 9 February. 
Skolnick, Arlene. 1991. Embattled Paradise: The American Family in an Age of Uncer- 
tainty. New York: Basic Books. 
Slater, Philip. 1970. The Pursuit of Loneliness. Boston: Beacon. 
Stacey, Judith. 1993. "Good Riddance to 'the Family': A Response to David Popenoe." 
Journal of Marriage and the Family 55(3): 545-47. 
Thornton, Arland, William Axinn, and Daniel Hill. 1992. "Reciprocal Effects of Reli- 
giosity, Cohabitation, and Marriage." American Journal of Sociology 98: 628-51. 
Tocqueville, Alexis De. 1835/1996. Democracy in America, translated by George Law- 
rence. New York: Harper & Row. 
Tufte, Virginia, and Barbara Myerhoff. 1979. Changing Images of the Fami[. New Ha- 
ven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Y 
Uhlenberg, Peter, and David Eggebeen. 1986. "The Declining Well-Being of American 
Adolescents." The Public Interest 82: 25-38. 
U.S. B~reau of the Census. 1996. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 116th ed. 
Washmgton, D.C.: GPO. 
The 1995 Virginia Slims American Women's Opinion Poll. 1995. A po]l conducted by 
Roper Starch Worldwide, Inc. 
Wallerstein, Judith S., and Susan Blakeslee. 1989. Second Chances: Men, Women and 
Children a Decade after Divorce. New York: Ticknor and Fields. 
White, Linda K. 1993. "Stepfamilies over the Life Course: Social Support." Paper pre- 
sented at the National Symposium on Stepfamilies. State College, Penn. 
Winch, Robert F. 1963. The Modern Family, rev. ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston. 
